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INTRODUCTION
The basis for Appellees' argument is that the only way for Appellants to be served
a summons and complaint was at the home of Appellant Jen Dressel' s mother and that
Appellants failed to provide support for a claim of mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect.
However, Appellees do not properly distinguish the present case from Reed v. Reed. 806
P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991). Appellees fail to address that alternative service was likely
obtainable and that Appellees chose not to seek such service. Appellees fail to recognize
that the basis for the Court's ruling provides for a post office box to be established as a
usual place of abode. Finally, that the Court's ruling that excusable neglect, mistake, or
surprise of service is not a proper element as recognized by Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) since
Appellants did not provide sufficient support of excusable neglect, mistake, or surprise and
Appellants received actual notice of the Complaint.
The fact of the matter is that the information used by the Court to determine the
totality did not come close to the totality of circumstance test that was used in Reed for
determining "a usual place of abode." 806 P.2d at 1184. Further, if it cannot be determined
whether Appellants actually live at a residence for which their mail is forwarded, Appellees
had alternatives for proper service, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)(A). Also, the exact
information that the Court used in its ruling supports that a post office box can be a usual
place of abode, which is impractical and inconclusive. It is well established in Metro. Water

Dist. Of Salt Lake v. Soif that excusable neglect, mistake, or surprise regarding service of
a summons and complaint is proper to set aside a default judgment. 2013 UT 27,

,r

16.

Finally, Appellees' statement that evidence exists that Appellants received actual notice is

Q

not supported by the actual facts alleged in the District Court. As such, the Court should
reverse the District Court's Ruling that service of the Complaint upon the home of
Appellant Jen Dressel's mother, which the District Court found to be Appellants' usual
place of abode and reverse the District Court's Ruling that Utah R. Civ. 60(b) does not
apply as to excusable neglect, mistake, or surprise in setting aside the Default Judgment
despite perfected service.
ARGUMENT
I.THE HOME OF APPELLANT JEN DRESSEL'S MOTHER WAS AND IS NOT
APPELLANTS' USUAL PLACE OF ABODE AND APPELLEES HAD THE
OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK ALTERNATIVE SERVICE.

Clearly, the issue before the Court is whether the address used by Appellees to serve
Appellants was their usual place of abode. However, based upon the totality test provided
in Reed, the totality of the facts fails to meet the necessary requirements for 191 Moonlight
Dr. to be Appellants' usual place of abode. 806 P.2d at 1184. Further, the facts for which
the District Court relied upon inconclusively established that a post office box can be a
usual place of abode, which is not practical. Further, Appellees had alternative means to
pursue serving Appellants and chose to not do so.
A. The Totality Test Used By the District Court Did Not Meet the Dispositive Issues
That Reed Established.

Appellees state that "[t]he facts of this case line up very well with the facts in the
Utah Supreme Court's Reed opinion" and that the "[t]he undisputed facts of this case are
analogous to the Reed opinion." See Appellees' Br. pp. 15-16, See Id. (brackets added).
Appellees incotTectly limit the scope of the totality test used in Reed to the fact that the
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party "listed his home address as that of his parents", resided at the place listed as the
residence of his parents, "failed to show that he lived elsewhere", and "received actual
notice of the proceedings." See Appellee Br., p. 15. However, the opinion in Reed relied
upon actual conclusive evidence than what was used to provide supp011 in the District
Court for the determination of "usual place of abode." 806 P.2d at 1184.
In Reed, the totality of circumstances used by the Court included that the party
actually resided with his parents just prior to service of the summons, was actually
witnessed in town at the time of service, used his parent's address for his tax returns the
previous year, and had knowledge of the summons less than two weeks after it had been
served. See Id., at 1184-85. Combine those factors with the fact that the party failed to
show he lived elsewhere, the Court determined that those totality of circumstances
established that his parent's home was his usual place of abode. See Id.
In comparison to the totality of circumstances in Reed to the present case,
Appellants, as a married couple, never lived with Appellant Jen Dressel's mother, there
was no witness of Appellants either at the home or in the town around the time of service,
the server never established that Appellants actually lived or were present at the home of
Appellant Jen Dressel's mother, no formal documentation were provided showing that the
address of Appellant Jen Dressel's mother was used by Appellants for tax returns or other
government filings, and it was only established that the Appellants had actual notice upon
receiving the Notice of Entry of Judgment in the mail, which was after the entering of the
Default Judgment and more than a month from the alleged service of the summons and
complaint. R. at 91-92,

~1 3-4, 94-95, ~if 3-5, 97-98, iriJ 2-7,
3

124, and 127. The only fact

that was used by the District Court in establishing the totality of evidence is that Appellants
left a forwarding address with Appellees and the US Post Office. R. at 119, 123, and 212,

ilil 7-24. No other factors were used that are remotely as conclusive as the factors used in
Reed. 806 P.2d at 1184-85.

In fact, even based upon the inc01Tect standard that Appellees provide under Reed,
the totality of circumstances is limited to only one factor. The fist factor that Appellees
state is the listing of a parent's home address, which Appellants did for the forwarding of
their mail. R. at 119 and 123, See Appellees 'Br., p. 15. The second factor is that Appellants
resided at the address of a parent at one point, which Appellants, as a married couple, never
resided at the home of Appellant Jen Dressel's mother. R. at 91-92, ,I,r 3-4, 94-95, ,r,r 3-5,
See Ibid. The third factor stated by Appellees is that Appellants failed to show they lived

elsewhere, which Appellants submitted sworn declarations that they did live somewhere
else. R. at 94-95,

,r,r 3-5, 136, ,r 2. Finally, Appellees state that Appellants received actual

notice of the proceedings, which is established that Appellants only received the Notice of
Entry of Judgment after the entering of the Default Judgment. R. at 91-92, ,I 4, 95,

,r 5.

Likewise, even under the incorrect factors provided by Appellees, there is only one factor
that is met concerning totality of circumstances.
While Appellees' quoting of Reed that "no hard and fast rule can be fashioned to
determine what is or is not a party's dwelling house or usual place of abode" is accurate,
one lone inconclusive factor is far too liberal to achieve "the just, speed, and inexpensive
determination of every action" without assuring due process is actually met. See Appellees'
Br., p. 14, 806 P .2d at 1185. Therefore, the totality of circumstances, as applied in Reed
4

and otherwise, fails to establish that service was attempted upon Appellant's usual place of
abode to provide Appellants proper due process as required by the United States
Constitution.

B. The District Court's Reliance Upon A Forwarding Address For Mail Is Not Clear
and Practical in Determining a Usual Place of Abode.
Appellees argue that the "District Court's ruling was not based solely on the
Dressels' forwarding of their mail to 191 Moonlight Dr., but instead, it was based on the
totality of the circumslances." See Appellees' Br., p. 21. However, the District Court
specifically stated in its Ruling:
In considering the circumstances in this matter, at the time of service,
defendants claim to have left Utah, lived in a mobile home with no address.
They provided an address in which they expected to be - have their deposit
sent to that address. It was the 191 Moonlight Drive in Washington. That was
the same address provided by the U.S. Postal Services as the defendants
forwarding address.
And, finally, the notice of judgment was sent to that address as well. And
that is the time period or at least the clairn in which respondents are saying
they became aware of the judgment. All roads point to the fact that his 191
Moonlight Drive in Washington is their usual place of abode and that was
where they expected to receive notifications regarding any mail that was
received. Not only the least agreements and things were still due and owning
on that. So I'm finding that there was effective service of process in this
matter and it's more likely that the respondents were avoiding service in this
matter.
R. at 213, ,r,r 7-24.
The District Court clearly stated that it considered that Appellants claimed to have
left Utah and lived in a motorhome, had mail forwarded to 191 Moonlight Drive, and
received the Notice of Entry of Judgment at the same address for which they had their mail
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forwarded. Based upon those facts, the District Court concluded that 191 Moonlight Drive
was Appellants' usual place of abode.
Those very same facts of a party living in a motorhome, forwarding their mail to a
parent's address, and receiving the Notice of Entry of Judgment in the mail gives support
that a post office box is legally a party's usual place of abode. Appellees state that a
determination of a post office box as a usual place of abode is "ridiculous", which
Appellants agree. See Appellees' Br., p. 22. However, Appellants prefer to characterize
such basis for a usual place of abode, supported by the aforementioned facts, as not
practical and in conflict with due process. To state simply, there really was not an
application of any totality of facts, other than there was a forwarding address to receive
mail, which could be used for service pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2)(A), provided that
Appellants sign a document indicating receipt. Likewise, an address used for receiving mail
can be used for service pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)(A) if granted by the District
Court for alternate service.
Nevertheless, it is not appropriate and not due process to rely solely on an address
used for forwarding mail to personal serve Appellants the summon and complaint. This is
especially true where the facts used to support a determination of usual place of abode also
provides that a post office box can be determined as a usual place of abode. As such, it is
impractical and likely not constitutional to determine that 191 Moonlight Dr. was
Appellants' usual place of abode based upon an address that Appellants used to forward
their mail.

C. The Disputed Facts Presented Required an Evidentiarv Hearing
6

Appellees argue that that the Appellants "provided no affidavits refuting the facts
asserted in the Cooper's declaration" and that the facts presented to the Court concerning
service of process are "relatively undisputed." See Appellees' Br., p. 19. The statement
made by Appellees is simply not true. A major disputed fact that was supported by
declaration, executed under oath, is the mother of Appellant Jen Dressel, Ms. McKeller.
Ms. McKeller testified in her declaration that she informed the process server that
neither of the Appellants lived at her residence and that she "refused to accept any papers
from the process server." R. at 98,

,r,r

6-7. The testimony of Ms. McKeller clearly

establishes relevant evidence, if admitted, directly competing with the representation of
facts presented by Appellees. It would likely be beneficial to the District Court to hear Ms.
McKeller's testimony in person and to have such testimony cross examined.
Further, Appellees argue that Appellants "provides no address or evidence that
another location was the [Appellants'] proper place of abode." See Appellees' Br.. p. 19
(bracket added). Appellants, through their own declarations, dispute such fact by stating
that they resided in a motorhome outside the State of Washington, where they were in
California at the time of the alleged service. R. at 94-95,

,r,r 3-5;

136,

,r 2.

Clearly this is

evidence that should be presented to the District Court in an evidentiary hearing.
The District Court is a trier of fact and it is difficult for the District Court to come
r,

to a conclusive conclusion without having been present with evidence of disputed facts to
make proper findings. Therefore, in order for the District Court to make conclusive findings
based upon the actual submission of evidence, including testimony of witnesses under oath
who are cross examined, an evidentiary hearing should have been and needs to be held.
7
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D. Appellees Chose Not To Seek Alternative Service AndThe District Court's Finding
That Appellants Avoided Service Wasan Improper Granting of Alternative Service
After the Fact.
Appellees argue that "[Appellants'] position that they had no place of abode for
service" is not accurate since Appellants testified that they resided in their motorhome in
California. See Appellees 'Br., p. 16; R. at 94-95, ifil 3-5; 136, iJ 2 (bracket added). Further,
Appellees argue that "[p ]ersonal service on a party living without an address would be
effectively impossible, and certainly impracticable and inefficient." See Appellees' Br., p.
16 (bracket added). Finally, Appellees contend that Appellants "provide no evidence or
testimony as to why they did not or could not have received actual notice to be served the
Summons at 191 Moonlight Dr." See Ibid.
Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)(A) provides that when the "identity or whereabouts of the
person to be served are unknown" alternative service can be obtained. Further, Utah R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(2)(A) provides that service can be processed by mail, as long as the "defendant
signs a documented receipt."
The District Court found that Appellants avoided service, although disputed by
Appellants, which provides that Appellees were eligible for alternative service. The
problem is that it was granted after the fact and should have been sought prior to granting
Appellees a default judgment. R. 213, ,r,r 7-24.
Appellants agree with Appellees that personal service upon a party without an
address is virtually impossible, which is why there is alternative service that can be
obtained by showing the unknown whereabouts of a party. Appellees knew that 191
Moonlight Dr. was not the usual place of abode for Appellants since Ms. McKeller
8

informed that process server that Appellants did not reside with her and refused to accept
the service. R. 98, ,, 6-7. Instead of then seeking alternative service, Appellees attempted
to push through their defective service, which was granted by the District Court. It was
improper for Appellees to attempt proper service without any verification that Appellants
actually resided at 19 i Moonlight Dr., other than having knowledge that Appellants caused
to have their mail forwarded to that address. As such, Appellees should have sought
alternative service, which was granted after the fact, and Appellants were not properly
served and the District Court's Ruling should be reversed as to proper service.

II.

APPELLANTS PROVIDED PROPER SUPPORT TO DEMONSTRATE
MIST AKE, SURPRISE, OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT TO WARRANT THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT TO BE SET ASIDE.
Appellees contend that Appellants did not provide any facts to support a claim of

mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect. See Appellees 'Br., p. 25. Further, Appellees argue
that Appellants failed to attempt to show the application of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l\
although Appellees provide a direct quote from Appellants brief specifically citing the
elements of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l). See Ibid. Despite Appellees' argument, it is clear that
Appellants sufficiently preserved an argument to set aside the Default Judgment pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l).
In contrast to Appellees argument that Appellees did not provide any support for a
claim of mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect, Appellants and Ms. McKeller testified
through their Declarations that Ms. McKeller never accepted service of the Summons and
Complaint and she did not have anything to forward onto Appellants to establish actual

9

Q

notice. See 91-92,

~ 4;

94-95, ~~ 3-5; 136, ~ 2; 97-98, ~~ 2-7. These testimonies demonstrate

that at the very least there was excusable neglect, if not surprise or mistake.
In Metro. Water Dist. Of Salt Lake v. Sorf, where the wife of a party being served
threw the summons and complaint on the ground and the remains of the documents were
gone when the party arrived at home, the Court specifically stated that it disagreed with
any finding that excusable neglect for setting aside a default judgment is negated by the
fact that proper service of the summons and complaint were perfected. 2013 UT 27,

~

16.

The Court stated that "if the default is issued when a party genuinely is mistaken to a point
where, absent such mistake, default would not have occurred, the equity side of the court
would grant relief." Id.
The holding by the Court in Metro. Water Dist., is in direct conflict with the District
Court's Ruling:
With regard to the motion to set aside using mistake, surprise, excusable
neglect, I don't find that because normally those circumstances come up
when a party obtains service and respondents then don't respond for one
reason or another. Usually some emergency. Maybe out of the country.
Those kinds of things wherein that rule comes into play. Here, I don't see
how if you don't respond you can get excusable neglect or mistake or
anything like that, claiming you weren't served. So I don't think under those
circumstances the motion to set aside is well taken. Based upon that then,
I'm going to deny the motion to set aside default judgment.
R. at 213-14,

~~

25, 1-10. The District Court states that excusable neglect or mistake are

not obtainable where it was found that Appellants were served. This conflicts with the
Court's holding that excusable neglect is not negated by a perfected service of the summons
and complaint. Id. Therefore, since the District Court's Ruling is inconsistent with
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precedent set by the Utah Supreme Court, Appellants should be allowed to claim at least
excusable neglect, if not surprise or mistake.
In the present case, since Ms. McKeller did not accept service, she did not have the
summons and complaint to provide to Appellants. Due to either her excusable neglect,
surprise, or mistake, or even excusable neglect, mistake, or surprise by Appellants, there
was no notice of the service, which absent such mistake Appellants would have responded
and the default would not have occun-ed. See Id. This is evident due to the fact that
Appellants responded immediately upon receiving the Notice of Entry of Judgment. R. at

91-92, 14; 95, 15.
Appellants sufficiently preserved an argument for Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Appellants
provided sufficient support that there was excusable neglect, mistake, or surprise
concerning their inability to file an answer to the Complaint, which resulted in a default
judgment. Therefore, the District Court's Ruling denying Appellants to set aside the default
judgment should be reversed.

II

II
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the District Court erred in determining usual place of
abode and denying Appellants to set aside the Default Judgment and Appellants
respectfully request for the Court to reverse the District Court's Ruling and Default
Judgment.
DATED this 7th, day of March, 2016.

LAKEY HOGELIN, PLLC

Jon
ogelin
At / ey for Appellant
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